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This article offers an in-depth analysis of the relationship between European law and the
case-law born of the European Convention. The author addresses the tension between
the drive for legal certainty and the need to expand fundamental rights. By offering an
overview of the legal reality that this tension has created, the author seeks to find the balance
between needless plurality and rigid certainty. Through this overview, the author argues
that the promotion of fundamental rights must be organised along lines of harmony and
not of uniformity. To do this, he offers a detailed analysis of the respective approaches
to the detention of asylum seekers and to the privilege against self-incrimination. The
article thus traces the increasingly inter-referential nature of Strasbourg and Luxembourg
jurisprudence, arguing that this trend has the potential to promote fundamental rights, as
long as the jurisdiction of human rights’ legislation is significantly expanded. The author
goes on to discuss the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, looking at the ways in which
it grew out of jurisprudence from both legal systems and how this cross-pollination may
change the expansion of fundamental rights in a wider sense.
It is hardly possible to over-estimate the long-term impact of the relationship between
the European Convention on Human Rights (‘‘the Convention’’ or ECHR) and EU law
on the protection of fundamental rights in Europe. While recent developments indicate
that a sense of common responsibility for fundamental rights is emerging in both legal
systems, the main challenge is to ensure that expanding the scope of fundamental rights
is not pursued at the cost of undermining legal certainty.
This article presents an overview of the developments which have characterised the
relationship between the Convention and EU law in recent years, considering to what
extent they are converging and thus promoting harmony and legal certainty. Given that
law-makers and judges appear to have been following somewhat different approaches
* The author writes in his personal capacity.
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on this score—the former striving for the expansion of fundamental rights and the
latter for their coherent interpretation—a separate section will be devoted to each.
This analysis reveals that despite the remarkable progress already achieved, further
efforts towards achieving harmony—not to be confused with uniformity—are required
if fundamental rights are to retain their fundamental nature, a pre-condition to their
effectiveness.
The case law of the European courts
For a long time, the Court of Justice of the European Communities (ECJ) and the
European Court of Human Rights have been seeking to adjust to each other’s case law.1
This trend has gained momentum in the last couple of years, as a result of a rapidly
growing number of issues of relevance to both legal systems. Both European courts
seem well aware that any discrepancies in the interpretation of the same fundamental
rights would be detrimental for citizens and Member States alike, if only because the
latter are bound to apply EU law at the same time as being within the jurisdiction of the
Strasbourg Court.2 Yet, while a fair amount of harmonisation between the Convention
and EU law has already been achieved by the European courts, some standards remain
unharmonised.
Harmonisation achieved by the European courts
The European Court of Justice
As early as 19753 the ECJ ruled that the Convention had ‘‘special significance’’ among the
legal sources to be taken into account when identifying the fundamental rights applicable
under EU law. Ever since that time, the ECJ has been relying on this doctrine—which
was later reinforced by art.6 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU)—as the legal basis
for drawing on Strasbourg case law.
The result today is an impressive list of judgments illustrating the ECJ’s commitment
to have regard to the Convention and adhere to Strasbourg’s interpretation when
applying fundamental rights. The rights most often referred to in this context include
1 See Luzius Wildhaber and Johan Callewaert, ‘‘Espace constitutionnel européen et droits
fondamentaux—Une vision globale pour une pluralité de droits et de juges’’ in N. Colneric
et al. (eds), Une communauté de droit (Festschrift für G.C. Rodriguez Iglesias) (Berlin: Berliner
Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2003), p.61; Johan Callewaert, ‘‘‘Unionisation’ and ‘Conventionisation’ of
Fundamental Rights in Europe: The Interplay between Union and Convention Law and its Impact
on the Domestic Legal Systems of the Member States’’ in J. Wouters, A. Nollkaemper and E.
de Wet (eds), The Europeanisation of International Law (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2008),
p.109.
2 Bosphorus v Ireland (2005) 42 E.H.R.R. 1 ECtHR.
3 Rutili v Ministre de l’Intérieur (36/75) [1975] E.C.R. 1219 ECJ.
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the right to a fair trial (art.6 ECHR),4 the right to respect for private5 and family life6 (art.8
ECHR), the right to freedom of expression (art.10 ECHR)7 and the right to protection of
property (art.1 of Protocol No.1).8
Commenting on these developments, former Advocate General Jacobs noted:
‘‘The ECJ has treated what is perhaps the most fundamental treaty in Europe,
the European Convention on Human Rights, as if it were binding upon the
Community, and has followed scrupulously the case-law of the European Court
of Human Rights, even though the European Union itself is not a party to the
Convention.’’9
In the—admittedly rather unusual—case of Spain v United Kingdom, the effect conferred
on a Strasbourg judgment by the ECJ was even more compelling.10 The case concerned
the execution of the judgment in the case of Matthews v United Kingdom11 in which the
4 e.g. Baustahlgewebe GmbH v European Commission (C-185/95 P) [1998] E.C.R. I-8417 ECJ (length
of proceedings); Bamberski v Krombach (C-7/98) [2000] E.C.R. I-1935 ECJ (trial in absentia); Criminal
Proceedings against Steffensen (C-276/01) [2003] E.C.R. I-3735 ECJ (admissibility of evidence); Varec
SA v Belgium (C-450/06) [2008] E.C.R. I-581 ECJ (right to adversarial proceedings); Criminal
Proceedings against Pupino (C-105/03) [2005] E.C.R. I-5285 ECJ (right to cross-examination); Katz
v Sos (C-404/07) judgment of October 9, 2008 ECJ (idem); Ordre des barreaux francophones et
germanophones v Conseil des Ministres (C-305/05) [2007] All E.R. (EC) 953; [2007] E.C.R. I-5305 ECJ
(compatibility of Directive 91/308 on money laundering with the right to a fair trial); Ingenieurburo
Michael Weiss und Partner GbR v Industrie- und Handelskammer Berlin (C-14/07) [2009] I.L.Pr. 24 ECJ
(translation of procedural documents); Franchet v European Commission (T-48/05) [2006] E.C.R.
II-2023 CFI (presumption of innocence); Kadi v European Council (C-402/05 P) [2008] E.C.R. I-6351
ECJ (right to be heard and right to an effective judicial review).
5 e.g. Rechnungshof v Österreichischer Rundfunk (C-465/00) [2003] E.C.R. I-4989 ECJ (processing
of personal data); Bavarian Lager Co Ltd v European Commission (T-194/04) [2008] 1 C.M.L.R. 35
CFI (access to Commission documents containing personal data); Varec SA v Belgium (C-450/06)
[2008] E.C.R. I-581 ECJ (right to observance of business secrets).
6 e.g. Carpenter v Secretary of State for the Home Department (C-60/00) [2002] E.C.R. I-6279 ECJ;
Secretary of State for the Home Department v Akrich (C-109/01) [2003] E.C.R. I-9607 ECJ (expulsion
of foreigners); European Parliament v European Council (C-540/03) [2006] E.C.R. I-5769 ECJ (family
reunification).
7 e.g. Connolly v European Commission (C-274/99 P) [2001] E.C.R. I-1611 ECJ (freedom of
expression of European civil servant); Eugen Schmidberger Internationale Transporte Planzuge v
Austria (C-112/00) [2003] E.C.R. I-5659 ECJ (right to demonstrate); Herbert Karner Industrie
Auktionen GmbH v Troostwijk GmbH (C-71/02) [2004] E.C.R. I-3025 ECJ (advertising); Kabel
Deutschland Vertrieb und Service GmbH & Co KG v Niedersachsische Landesmedienanstalt fur Privaten
Rundfunk (C-336/07) [2009] 2 C.M.L.R. 6 ECJ (obligation to provide access to cable network);
Criminal Proceedings against Damgaard (C-421/07), judgment of April 2, 2009 ECJ (dissemination
of information about a medicinal product).
8 e.g. Regione Autonoma Friuli-Venezia Giulia v Ministero delle le Politiche Agricole e Forestali (C-
347/03) [2005] E.C.R. I-3785 ECJ (use of a brand); Kadi [2008] E.C.R. I-6351 (freezing of funds—fight
against terrorism).
9 Francis G. Jacobs, The Sovereignty of Law (Cambridge University Press, 2007), p.54.
10 Spain v United Kingdom (C-145/04) [2006] E.C.R. I-7917 ECJ.
11 Matthews v United Kingdom (1999) 28 E.H.R.R. 361 ECtHR.
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European Court of Human Rights had found a violation of art.3 of Protocol No.1 to
the ECHR on account of the ban which, pursuant to the 1976 Act,12 had prevented the
residents of Gibraltar from participating in the elections to the European Parliament.
After it became clear that Spain would oppose any initiatives by the United Kingdom
to have the 1976 Act amended by the European Union so as to execute the Matthews
judgment, the United Kingdom opted for a domestic-law solution and passed the
European Parliament (Representation) Act 2003. This prompted Spain to challenge that
Act before the ECJ under art.227 EC. The ECJ, however, rejected the appeal, stressing
the need for EU law to be interpreted in compliance with the Matthews judgment, even
at the expense of disregarding the provisions which it had declared incompatible with
the Convention but which were still in force.13
The European Court of Human Rights
A similar concern about harmony with EU law and ECJ jurisprudence has been shown
by the European Court of Human Rights; this is demonstrated by the increasing number
of Strasbourg judgments drawing on EU legal sources, sometimes even in support of
major changes to the case law.
Examples of the latter category include the Court’s judgments in the cases of DH v
Czech Republic, Maslov v Austria, Zolotukhin v Russia, Scoppola v Italy and Micallef v Malta.
In DH the Strasbourg Court based itself on EU legal sources when ruling for the first
time that ‘‘reliable and significant’’ statistics could constitute prima facie evidence of
indirect discrimination.14 In Maslov the Court found support in ECJ jurisprudence for
considering that it was an applicant’s actual expulsion, rather than the expulsion order,
that had to pass the Convention test.15 In Zolotukhin the Court sought guidance from EU
law when deciding that the notion of ‘‘offence’’ within the meaning of art.4 of Protocol
No.7 to the ECHR (non bis in idem) was henceforth to be understood as referring only
to the facts underlying an offence.16 In Scoppola the Court had regard to art.49(1) of the
EU Charter on Fundamental Rights and relevant ECJ jurisprudence when ruling that
art.7(1) ECHR implicitly imposed to retrospectively apply the more lenient criminal
law in pending proceedings.17 Finally, in Micallef the Court also relied on ECJ case
law in reaching the conclusion that art.6 ECHR would henceforth apply to injunction
proceedings initiated with a view to taking interim measures, to the extent that those
measures determine civil rights and obligations within the meaning of the provision.18
12 Act Concerning the Election of the Representatives of the European Parliament by Direct
Universal Suffrage (September 20, 1976).
13 Spain v United Kingdom [2006] E.C.R. I-7917 at [95].
14 DH v Czech Republic (2007) 47 E.H.R.R. 3 ECtHR at [81]–[91] and [184].
15 Maslov v Austria (App. No.1638/03), judgment of June 23, 2008 ECtHR at [93].
16 Zolotukhin v Russia (App. No.14939/03), judgment of February 10, 2009 ECtHR at [33]–[38]
and [82]. On non bis in idem see further below.
17 Scoppola v Italy (App. No.10249/03), judgment of September 17, 2009 ECtHR.
18 Micallef v Malta (App. No.17056/06), judgment of October 15, 2009 ECtHR. Further (but
older) evidence of the impact of EU law on the Strasbourg case law is to be found in Pellegrin v
France (1999) 31 E.H.R.R. 26 ECtHR and Goodwin v United Kingdom (2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 18 ECtHR.
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In several other judgments, the European Court of Human Rights took into account
the effects of EU law in the legal systems of the Member States. Thus, in Dangeville
v France19 the Court found the applicant company’s reimbursement claim, which was
based on an EC Directive granting an exemption from VAT, to amount to a ‘‘possession’’
within the meaning of art.1 of Protocol No.1. In Mendizabal v France,20 the Court ruled
that, given the applicant’s EU citizenship, the notion of ‘‘law’’ within the meaning of
art.8 had to be construed in the light of Community law, notably its provisions relating
to the entry and residence of EU citizens.
In the case of John v Germany,21 the Court confirmed that the refusal to refer a case
to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling under art.234 EC could infringe the fairness of
proceedings within the meaning of art.6 ECHR if it appeared to be arbitrary.22 In Ooms v
France23 the Court reached the conclusion that Directive 95/2, as transposed into French
domestic law, was compatible with art.7 ECHR.
However, the most comprehensive contribution by the Strasbourg Court towards
maintaining harmony with the jurisprudence of the ECJ came with the judgment in the
landmark case of Bosphorus v Ireland, which established a presumption of ‘‘equivalent
protection’’. The case concerned the impounding of an aircraft by the Irish authorities,
pursuant to Regulation 990/93.24
In this judgment, the Court held that State action taken in compliance with legal
obligations flowing from the State’s membership of an international organisation was
justified where—like the EU in respect of Community law—the organisation protected
fundamental rights in a manner which was at least equivalent to the protection under the
Convention. Where such equivalent protection was ensured, the presumption would
be that a State had not departed from the requirements of the Convention where
it did no more than implement legal obligations flowing from its membership of the
organisation. However, any such presumption could be rebutted if, in the circumstances
of a particular case, the protection concerned was manifestly deficient.25 Moreover, a
State would be fully responsible under the Convention for all acts falling outside its
strict international legal obligations.
The Court first applied the presumption in Coopérative des Agriculteurs de Mayenne
v France.26 It did the same in Nederlandse Kokkelvisserij v Netherlands,27 rejecting a
19 Dangeville SA v France (2002) 38 E.H.R.R. 32 ECtHR.
20 Mendizabal v France (App. No.51431/99), judgment of January 17, 2006 ECtHR.
21 John v Germany (2007) 45 E.H.R.R. SE4 ECtHR.
22 See also Ullens v Belgium (App. No.38353/07), pending.
23 Ooms v France (App. No.38126/06), judgment of September 25, 2008 ECtHR.
24 Bosphorus v Ireland (2005) 42 E.H.R.R. 1.
25 This is a major difference from the ‘‘Solange’’ approach of the German Constitutional
Court. Indeed, whereas the Bosphorus-presumption can be rebutted on a case-by-case basis, the
‘‘Solange’’ approach requires proof of structural or large-scale shortcomings in the protection of
fundamental rights under Community law for the presumption to be rebutted (BVerfGE, 102,
164).
26 Coopérative des Agriculteurs de Mayenne v France (App. No.16931/04), decision of October 2,
2006 ECtHR.
27 Cooperatieve producentenorganisatie van de Nederlandse Kokkelvisserij UA v Netherlands (2009)
48 E.H.R.R. SE18 ECtHR.
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complaint under art.6 concerning the fact that the applicant association had not been
allowed to submit a response to the Opinion of the Advocate General before the ECJ
gave judgment.28
Given the ECJ’s commitment to following Strasbourg case law, it will come as no
surprise that to date no ‘‘manifest deficiency’’ has been identified by the Strasbourg
Court. And with the EU Charter playing an increasingly important role in ECJ
jurisprudence,29 the emergence of such a ‘‘manifest deficiency’’ becomes ever more
unlikely, given that the Charter itself adopts the Convention as the EU minimum
standard.30 Against this background and through the Bosphorus-presumption and its
tolerance as regards ‘‘non manifest’’ deficiencies, the protection of fundamental rights
under Community law is policed with less strictness than under the Convention. This
is paradoxical because, judging by the developments described above, this is precisely
the kind of treatment the ECJ has sought to renounce.31
However, in practice it may be more important to clarify the scope of the presumption
of equivalence. Several criteria come into play here. First, the Convention must be
applicable ratione personae to the State concerned. This will only be the case if the
State has acted in a way capable of triggering its responsibilities under the Convention.
Conversely, there will be no such responsibility if the impugned measure resulted solely
from action taken by an EU institution without any direct or indirect involvement of the
Member State concerned.32
28 The Court considered that the case differed from cases declared inadmissible ratione personae
(see the Court’s decision in the case of Connolly v 15 EU Member States (App. No.73274/01),
decision of December 9, 2008) in that the applicant’s complaint was based on an intervention
of the ECJ actively sought by a domestic court in proceedings pending before it. It could not
therefore be found that the respondent party was in no way involved.
29 See, among others, Parliament v Council (C-540/03) [2006] E.C.R. I-5769; Advocaten voor de
Wereld VZW v Leden van de Ministerraad (C-303/05) [2008] All E.R. (EC) 317 ECJ; Productores
de Musica de Espana (Promusicae) v Telefonica de Espana SAU (C-275/06) [2008] E.C.R. I-271
ECJ.
30 See art.52(3) of the Charter.
31 The question remains, though, what exactly are ‘‘manifest deficiencies’’? Indeed, in the
absence of relevant case law, it could still not be clarified whether in this context ‘‘manifest’’
means only ‘‘clear’’, ‘‘obvious’’ or also ‘‘serious’’ and/or ‘‘gross’’. Every gross violation of the
Convention is certainly manifest, but not every manifest violation is a gross one. In his concurring
opinion to the judgment, Judge Ress takes the view that the protection of a Convention right
would be manifestly deficient if, in deciding the key question in a case, the ECJ were to depart
from the interpretation or the application of the Convention or the Protocols that had already been
the subject of well-established ECHR case law. But even this scenario seems fairly unrealistic. In
another concurring opinion, Judge Rozakis and his colleagues take the view that ‘‘in spite of its
relatively undefined nature, the criterion ‘manifestly deficient’ appears to establish a relatively
low threshold, which is in marked contrast to the supervision generally carried out under the
European Convention on Human Rights’’. Yet if this had been the Court’s intention, one wonders
why it did not follow the Solange approach by not allowing a case-by-case review of Community
law protection.
32 Connolly v 15 EU Member States (App. No.73274/01), decision of December 9, 2008
ECtHR.
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Next, a question arises concerning the amount of discretion which the ECJ sometimes
leaves to the domestic courts regarding the implementation of preliminary rulings.33 In
their concurring opinion, Judge Rozakis and his colleagues consider such discretion not
to be covered by the presumption since, according to the Bosphorus judgment at [157],
‘‘a State would be fully responsible under the Convention for all acts falling outside
its strict international legal obligations’’. It must be remembered that one of the main
reasons which prompted the Court to rely on the presumption of equivalent protection
was the need to safeguard European integration by preventing EU legal acts from being
challenged in Strasbourg on a systematic basis.34 Yet, to the extent that these acts are
applied and/or complemented on a purely national scale, this justification looses much
of its relevance.
Finally, by limiting the scope of the Bosphorus judgment to Community law in the
narrow sense, i.e. the so-called first pillar,35 the scope of the presumption is also limited.
This rules out its application to the two other pillars relating to the Common Foreign
and Security Policy and the Area of Justice, Freedom and Security respectively. Given
the emphasis placed in the Bosphorus judgment on the key role of the ECJ in protecting
human rights under EU law, it can safely be assumed that the restricted competence of
the ECJ in respect of these two pillars is an implied reason for this limitation.
But how about the third pillar cases which the ECJ has actually reviewed by virtue
of art.35 TEU?36 Do they qualify for the application of the presumption of equivalence?
And what will the situation be under the Lisbon Treaty when ECJ competences in the
Area of Freedom, Justice and Security are significantly expanded?37 Last but not least,
a question will also arise as to the effects on the Bosphorus-presumption of accession by
the European Union to the Convention.38 The Court has not been called upon to answer
these questions yet, but that might change in the not too distant future.
Standards left unharmonised
In spite of the quite encouraging developments described above, there is still some way
to go for the European Courts in harmonising fundamental rights standards. There are
still areas where such harmonisation has yet to take place, as illustrated by the following
two examples that concern the privilege against self-incrimination and the detention of
asylum seekers. While the number of these ‘‘unharmonised’’ areas does remain modest
33 See, as examples of such rulings, Österreichischer Rundfunk (C-465/00) [2003] E.C.R. I-4989;
Proceedings brought by Möllendorf (C-117/06) [2008] 1 C.M.L.R. 11 ECJ; International Transport
Workers’ Federation v Viking Line ABP ’(C-438/05) [2007] E.C.R. I-10779 ECJ; Promusicae (C-275/06)
[2008] E.C.R. I-271.
34 ‘‘The Court has also long recognised the growing importance of international co-operation
and of the consequent need to secure the proper functioning of international organisations . . .
Such considerations are critical for a supranational organisation such as the EC’’ (Bosphorus v
Ireland (2005) 42 E.H.R.R. 1 at [150]).
35 Bosphorus v Ireland (2005) 42 E.H.R.R. 1 at [72].
36 e.g. Pupino (C-105/03) [2005] E.C.R. I-5285; Criminal Proceedings against Gözütok (C-187/01)
[2003] E.C.R. I-1345 ECJ.
37 arts 267 and 276 of the future Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
38 As provided for by art.6(2) TEU (as amended by the Lisbon Treaty).
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and their impact should therefore not be overestimated, they nonetheless raise the
question as to how any differences in fundamental rights standards can be justified; this
will be touched on in the concluding remarks of this article.
The privilege against self-incrimination39
The two European courts are in broad agreement about the need to respect the privilege
against self-incrimination as an element of the right to a fair trial.40 However they
disagree on whether the privilege should cover statements which are not incriminating
by themselves, such as exculpatory remarks or information confined to questions of
fact.
Under the Convention such statements are covered by the privilege, the Strasbourg
Court considering that even if they can be regarded as non-incriminating when they
are being made, they might still be used against the accused at a later stage of the
proceedings and serve as a basis for his conviction. Consequently, an accused cannot be
forced to make such statements and their use in criminal proceedings would give rise
to a breach of art.6 ECHR.41
Under EU law the privilege is particularly relevant in the context of investigations
into breaches of EU competition law by private companies. However, in contrast to the
Strasbourg case law, the privilege is limited to statements which directly involve an
admission of guilt. Consequently it does not preclude a ‘‘defendant’’ company from
being forced to answer purely factual questions or to produce documents containing
such information. According to the EU courts, there is nothing to prevent the addressee
of a request for information from showing, in subsequent judicial proceedings, that
the factual information concerned has a different meaning from that given to it by, for
instance, the European Commission.42
Detention of asylum seekers
A new divergence between Convention and EU standards has recently emerged as the
result of the judgment in the case of Saadi v United Kingdom43 in which the Strasbourg
Court was called upon to decide whether asylum seekers could lawfully be detained
for the purpose of speeding up the processing of their application. In the case at
39 On this, see Johan Callewaert, ‘‘The Privilege against Self-Incrimination in European
Law—An Illustration of the Impact of the Plurality of Courts and Legal Sources on the Protection
of Fundamental Rights in Europe’’ (2004) 4 ERA-Forum 488.
40 Jalloh v Germany (2006) 44 E.H.R.R. 32 ECtHR at [100]; Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij NV
(LVM) v European Commission (C-238/99 P) [2002] E.C.R. I-8375 ECJ at [273].
41 Saunders v United Kingdom (1996) 23 E.H.R.R. 313 ECtHR; JB v Switzerland (App.
No.31827/96), judgment of May 3, 2001 ECtHR; O’Halloran v United Kingdom (2007) 46 E.H.R.R.
21 ECtHR.
42 Orkem SA (formerly CdF Chimie SA) v European Commission (C-374/87) [1989] E.C.R. 3283
at [34]–[35]; Mannesmannröhren-Werke AG v European Commission (T-112/98) [2001] E.C.R. II-729
at [66]–[67]; Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij NV (C-238/99 P) [2002] E.C.R. I-8375 at [273]–[276];
European Commission v SGL Carbon AG (C-301/04 P) [2006] 5 C.M.L.R. 15 at [43]–[45].
43 Saadi v United Kingdom (2008) 47 E.H.R.R. 17 ECtHR.
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hand, the applicant had been detained for seven days, even though he had always
reported as required by the authorities. After thoroughly examining the facts of the case
and satisfying itself that they did not reveal any arbitrariness, the Court reached the
conclusion (at [80]) that,
‘‘given the difficult administrative problems with which the United Kingdom was
confronted during the period in question, with an escalating flow of huge numbers
of asylum-seekers. . . it was not incompatible with Article 5 § 1(f) of the Convention
to detain the applicant for seven days in suitable conditions to enable his claim to
asylum to be processed speedily’’.44
This is in conflict with the EU directive on minimum procedural standards for granting
and withdrawing refugee status,45 which provides inter alia that ‘‘Member States shall
not hold a person in detention for the sole reason that he/she is an applicant for asylum’’
(art.18(1)).
The different approach being followed in Strasbourg stems—at least partly—from
the fact that the Convention provision applied in the Saadi case (art.5(1)(f)) has a much
wider scope than the Directive; first, it is not limited to the 27 EU Member States but
extends to the 47 states parties to the Convention and, secondly, it is not limited to
asylum seekers either, covering as it does all persons seeking to enter the territory of a
contracting state, no matter on what ground. Yet, when it comes to applying art.5(1)(f)
to asylum seekers in the European Union, the contrast remains, as pointed out in the
dissenting opinion of the Saadi judgment.
European legislation
In the field of legislation the picture is also a mixed one. While the EU Charter represents
a commendable attempt at keeping new EU legislation on fundamental rights in line
with the Convention, other EU legal instruments give rise to some concern.
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights
From the outset the Charter raised many questions about its relationship with the
Convention, given that about half of its provisions are borrowed from the Convention
or from Strasbourg jurisprudence. Within this half are found approximately 90 per
cent of the justiciable rights contained in the Charter. The main problem arose in
respect of the drafters’ intention to ‘‘simplify’’ the wording of a substantial number of
Convention provisions, so as to make them easier to understand, while sticking to the
scope and meaning they have under the Convention. Despite its merit, this approach
risks undermining legal certainty and causing considerable confusion among lawyers,
particularly in view of the fact that possible discrepancies in the interpretation of the
44 See on this judgment Jean-Yves Carlier, ‘‘L’accès au territoire et la détention de l’étranger
demandeur d’asile’’ [2009] Revue trimestrielle des droits de l’homme 795.
45 Directive 2005/85 on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting and
withdrawing refugee status [2005] OJ L326/13.
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rights concerned cannot be settled by reference to the supremacy of EU law, in the
absence of such supremacy in relation to the Convention.
After much debate within the EU-Convention in charge of drafting the Charter
and the active involvement of the Strasbourg Observers to that Convention,46 a
solution was found which is now laid down in art.52(3) of the Charter47 and is
based on two complementary rules. According to the first, the rights borrowed from
the Convention are to be given the same meaning and scope as under the Convention,
regardless of their wording. In the light of the Preamble and the Explanations to
art.52 of the Charter48 it is clear that for the determination of this meaning, regard
is to be had to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and
the ECJ.49 According to the second rule, EU law is free to offer more extensive
protection.50
In Strasbourg this solution has always been considered satisfactory. For, in addition to
preserving legal certainty by clarifying the scope and the meaning of the new provisions
in relation to the Convention, it helps to avoid clashes by formally acknowledging the
Convention standards as minimum EU standards. However, it cannot be denied that it
will also increase the complexity of European law in the field of fundamental rights to
the extent that other legal sources will have to be consulted when determining the exact
scope and meaning of the Charter provisions concerned. Thus, the ‘‘simplification’’ that
was sought may not result in simplification in practice.51 This complexity will grow
with the impact of the ‘‘opt outs’’ granted to the United Kingdom and Poland by the
Lisbon Treaty.52
Other legislation
Sometimes, however, the law stands in the way of a proper harmonisation of EU and
Convention standards, as illustrated by two examples, relating to the protection of
foreigners against expulsion and non bis in idem respectively.
46 Mr Marc Fischbach, Judge at the European Court of Human Rights, and Mr Hans Christian
Krüger, Deputy Secretary General of the Council of Europe.
47 [2007] OJ C303.
48 [2007] OJ C303/33.
49 Gil Carlos Rodriguez Iglesias, speech given at the Solemn hearing of the European Court
of Human Rights on the occasion of the opening of the judicial year, January 31, 2002; European
Court of Human Rights, Strasbourg, Annual Report 2001, p.35.
50 Which indeed the Charter itself already does in respect of, for example, the right to marry
and to found a family (art.9), the right to an effective remedy (art.47(1)) as well as to legal aid
(art.47(3)). Unlike lower standards, higher standards do not undermine the necessary harmony
between the Convention and the Charter. For, in line with the principle of subsidiarity underlying
the Strasbourg system, the Convention itself, in its art.53, allows its standards to be surpassed
‘‘‘under the laws of any High Contracting Party or under any other agreement to which it is a
Party’’‘.
51 Compare, for instance, art.5 ECHR with art.6 of the Charter which, according to the
Explanations to the latter ([2007] OJ C303/17 (19)), is meant to have the same ‘‘meaning and
scope’’ as the former provision.
52 See the Protocol on the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union to Poland and to the United Kingdom ([2007] OJ C306/156).
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Protection of foreigners against expulsion
The protection of foreigners against expulsion has developed into a vast and complex
area which it is not possible to cover in this article. It is nonetheless worth noting the
fundamentally different approaches being followed in Brussels and Strasbourg in this
area and their consequences.
First, under EU law the status and rights which a person seeking protection from
expulsion is entitled to claim will vary according to whether this person is an EU citizen,
a person who has exercised his right of freedom of movement, a family member of
one of the former categories or none of the above.53 Even though the ECJ does seek
to harmonise the protection enjoyed by each of these categories through increased
reliance on the notion of EU citizenship,54 differences still remain in relation to the
rights attached to each of these categories.55 In addition, as recently emphasised by the
ECJ, under EU law the protection of the family life of EU citizens is primarily designed
to eliminate obstacles to the exercise of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the
EC Treaty.56
By contrast, the decisive consideration when assessing whether protection from
expulsion should be granted under art.8 ECHR57 will not so much be the nationality
or legal status of the persons concerned, but rather the extent of their social integration
in the host country.58 This is evaluated by reference to criteria relating to the personal
situation of an applicant and his family members, which will necessarily involve an
element of duration.59 Thus, while under EU law the specific legal category to which
a foreigner belongs will usually be decisive for determining the protection against
expulsion to which he is entitled, any foreigner can qualify for protection under art.8
53 See, among others, Carpenter (C-60/00) [2002] E.C.R. I-6279; Poirrez v Caf de la Seine Saint-
Denis (C-206/91) [1992] E.C.R. I-6685 ECJ; Trojani v Centre Public d’Aide Sociale de Bruxelles
(C-456/02) [2004] E.C.R. I-7573 ECJ; Proceedings brought by Turpeinen (C-520/04) [2006] E.C.R.
I-10685 ECJ; Metock v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform (C-127/08) [2009] Q.B. 318
ECJ.
54 e.g. in Turpeinen (C-520/04) [2006] E.C.R. I-10685.
55 As recently illustrated in Metock (C-127/08) [2009] Q.B. 318.
56 Metock (C-127/08) [2009] Q.B. 318 at [56]. See also Mouvement contre le Racisme, l’Antisemitisme
et la Xenophobie ASBL (MRAX) v Belgium (C-459/99) [2002] E.C.R. I-6591 ECJ at [53]; European
Commission v Germany (C-441/02), judgment of April 27, 2006 ECJ at [109].
57 art.3 ECHR will not be considered here as it concerns the wholly different situation of
foreigners under the threat of an expulsion to a country where they can be expected to suffer
ill-treatment (e.g. Saadi v Italy (2008) 49 E.H.R.R. 30 ECtHR).
58 However, the increased protection enjoyed by EU citizens is not considered discriminatory
by the Strasbourg Court, the existence of the EU legal order providing an objective and reasonable
justification for it (Moustaquim v Belgium (1991) 13 E.H.R.R. 802 ECtHR at [49]; C v Belgium (1996)
32 E.H.R.R. 2 ECtHR at [38]).
59 The full list of these criteria is to be found in the judgments given in the cases of Boultif v
Switzerland (2001) 33 E.H.R.R. 50 ECtHR, Üner v Netherlands ( 2006) 45 E.H.R.R. 14 ECtHR and
Maslov v Austria (App. No.1638/03), judgment of June 23, 2008 ECtHR. See Charlotte Steinorth,
‘‘Üner v The Netherlands: Expulsion of Long-term Immigrants and the Right to Respect for
Private and Family Life’’ (2008) 8 H.R.L. Rev. 185.
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ECHR, regardless of his nationality or legal status, provided his actual links with the
host country are sufficiently strong.60
In addition, important differences exist between the two systems as regards the
procedural safeguards against expulsion. On the one hand, the Strasbourg Court
declined to apply art.6 ECHR to expulsion procedures, considering that,
‘‘decisions regarding the entry, stay and deportation of aliens do not concern the
determination of an applicant’s civil rights or obligations or of a criminal charge
against him, within the meaning of art.6 § 1 of the Convention’’.61
On the other hand, however, and in stark contrast to the Strasbourg approach, under
EU law an increasing number of safeguards, comparable to those laid down in art.6
ECHR, are being provided in expulsion procedures.62
Non bis in idem
It might be hard to find a fundamental right which over the years has given rise to
more different formulations and interpretations than non bis in idem.63 Even though it
features, with varying wordings, in a sizeable number of national laws and international
instruments,64 the following observations will focus on the situation under Convention
and EU law.
60 See Luzius Wildhaber, ‘‘The Right of Residence of the Foreign Spouse—An Example
Of Fruitful Cooperation Between Coexistent Human Rights Protection Systems in Europe’’ in
G.J.M. Corstens, W.J.M. Davids and M.I. Veldt-Foglia (eds), Europeanisering van het Nederlands
Recht—opstellen aangeboden aan W.E. Haak (Deventer: Kluwer, 2004), p.30.
61 Maaouia v France (2000) 33 E.H.R.R. 42 ECtHR.
62 e.g. Directive 2004/38 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to
move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States [2004] OJ L158/77; Directive
2003/109 concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents [2003] OJ
L16/44. See also art.47 of the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights.
63 See Christina Karakosta, ‘‘Ne bis in idem: une jurisprudence peu visible pour un droit
intangible’’ [2008] Revue trimestrielle des droits de l’homme 25; Uno Lohmus, ‘‘The ne bis in idem
Principle in the Case-law of the European Court of Justice and of the European Court of Human
Rights’’ in Stephan Breitenmoser et al. (eds), Droits de l’homme, démocratie et Etat de droit, Liber
amicorum Luzius Wildhaber (Zürich, St-Gallen, Baden-Baden, 2007), pp.411 et seq.; Hanspeter
Mock, ‘‘‘‘Ne bis in idem’, une locution dont le sens ne semble pas être le même à Luxembourg
qu’à Strasbourg’’ [2006] Revue trimestrielle des droits de l’homme 635; Hanspeter Mock, ‘‘Ne bis in
idem: Strasbourg tranche en faveur de l’identité des faits’’ [2009] Revue trimestrielle des droits de
l’homme 867; Steve Peers, ‘‘Double Jeopardy and EU Law: Time for a Change?’’ (2006) 8 E.J.L.R.
199.
64 Among the Council of Europe instruments, see the European Convention on Extradition
(art.9), the Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Extradition (art.2), the European
Convention on the Punishment of Road Traffic Offences (arts 8–9), the European Convention on
the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters (arts 35–37), the Convention on the Transfer of
Sentenced Persons (art.8), the European Convention on Offences relating to Cultural Property
(art.17), the Agreement on illicit traffic by sea, implementing Article 17 of the United Nations
Convention against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances (arts 2, 3, 14); the
Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (art.31: conflict of
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In the Convention, non bis in idem is laid down in art.4(1) of Protocol No.7, according
to which,
‘‘no one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings under
the jurisdiction of the same State for an offence for which he has already been
finally acquitted or convicted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of
that State’’.
The importance attaching to the principle is reflected in art.4(3) which elevates non bis in
idem to one of the few rights from which derogation is not allowed under art.15 ECHR.
Interestingly, art.50 of the EU Charter on fundamental rights uses roughly the same
wording, except for the limitation to criminal convictions within the same country.65
Under current EU law, non bis in idem plays a role in two different areas, each regulated
by different provisions. The first area is competition law where it has been found by the
ECJ to be a
‘‘fundamental principle of Community law also enshrined in Article 4 (1) of Protocol
No 7 to the ECHR [which] precludes, in competition matters, an undertaking from
being found guilty or proceedings from being brought against it a second time on
the grounds of anti-competitive conduct in respect of which it has been penalised
or declared not liable by a previous un-appealable decision’’.66
In addition, non bis in idem plays an increasingly important role in facilitating the free
movement of persons in the area of Freedom, Security and Justice, notably through
art.54 ECHR implementing the Schengen Agreement, which reads:
‘‘a person whose trial has been finally disposed of in one Contracting Party may
not be prosecuted in another Contracting Party for the same acts provided that, if a
penalty has been imposed, it has been enforced, is actually in the process of being
enforced or can no longer be enforced under the laws of the sentencing Contracting
Party’’.67
One of the main difficulties in interpreting this provision faced by the ECJ was the
determination of the scope of idem. The conclusion reached was that:
jurisdiction), the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation
of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism (art.28).
65 It is true that according to its wording, art.4 of Protocol No.7 only prohibits double jeopardy
by the same State. However, it seems clear that by referring to the ‘‘same State’’ the drafters of
this provision had in mind not so much the geographical or political but rather the legal entity
concerned. Thus, it cannot be ruled out that in the context of an integrated legal system such as
the one created by Community law, the Strasbourg Court might one day hold that non bis in idem
was breached on account of a double prosecution by two different States acting as members of
the same legal system.
66 Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij NV [2002] E.C.R. I-8375 at [59].
67 See also the European Commission’s Green Paper on Conflicts of Jurisdiction and the
Principle of ne bis in idem in Criminal Proceedings, COM(2005)696 final, December 23, 2005.
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‘‘Because there is no harmonisation of national criminal laws, a criterion based on
the legal classification of the acts or on the protected legal interest might create as
many barriers to freedom of movement within the Schengen territory as there are
penal systems in the Contracting States. In those circumstances, the only relevant
criterion for the application of Article 54 of the CISA is identity of the material acts,
understood in the sense of the existence of a set of concrete circumstances which
are inextricably linked together.’’68
Much earlier, the European Court of Human Rights was confronted with the same
difficulty and has struggled ever since to come up with a coherent approach to idem.
However, the result was nothing more than a number of conflicting judgments on the
issue, some relying only on the conduct of the defendant (idem factum),69 others relying
on the multiple legal classifications and offences to which one set of facts can give rise
(concours idéal d’infractions)70 and a third category focusing on the so-called ‘‘essential
elements’’ of the multiple offences concerned.71
Finally, in the Zolotukhin case, a Grand Chamber of the Strasbourg Court decided to
put an end to this confusion, which it considered was producing a ‘‘legal uncertainty
incompatible with a fundamental right’’. 72 Pointing to the case law of the ECJ and the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, it ruled that a more restrictive approach could
no longer be justified by reason of the word ‘‘offence’’ appearing in the text of art.4 of
Protocol No.7. Consequently, art.4 was to be understood as prohibiting the prosecution
or trial of a second ‘‘offence’’ in so far as it arose from identical facts or facts which were
substantially the same.
This may be a good case to close the list of divergences between Convention and EU
standards, as it shows how differences can be ironed out by European courts, in spite of
the divergent wording of the relevant provisions.73
Concluding remarks: keeping fundamental rights fundamental
The developments described above ultimately go to the heart of the notion of
fundamental rights. For if one asks the question ‘‘what makes fundamental rights
fundamental?’’, one might meet a broad consensus that fundamental rights are supposed
to go to the very essence, the basic needs—or indeed the dignity—of every human being
and that, because of this fundamental nature, they should be enjoyed in the same way by
68 Criminal Proceedings against Van Esbroeck (C-436/04) [2006] E.C.R. I-2333 ECJ at [35]–[36].
On the same line: Criminal Proceedings against Kraaijenbrink (C-367/05) [2007] 3 C.M.L.R. 44 ECJ
and Kretzinger v Hauptzollamt Augsburg (C-288/05) [2007] E.C.R. I-6441 ECJ; Criminal Proceedings
against Bourquain (C-297/07), judgment of December 11, 2008 ECJ.
69 Gradinger v Austria (App. No.15963/90), judgment of October 23, 1995 ECtHR.
70 Oliveira v Switzerland (1998) 28 E.H.R.R. 289 ECtHR.
71 Fischer v Austria (App. No.37950/97), judgment of May 29, 2001 ECtHR. See also the
summary of the different approaches followed so far in Zolotukhin v Russia (App. No.14939/03),
judgment of February 10, 2009 at [70] et seq.
72 Zolotukhin v Russia (App. No.14939/03), judgment of February 10, 2009 at [78].
73 See, as another example, DH v Czech Republic (2007) 47 E.H.R.R. 3, where the Court endorsed
the notion of indirect discrimination as applied under EU law.
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the largest possible number of people: everyone should be protected from ill-treatment,
everyone should be entitled to a fair hearing, everyone should be allowed to speak
freely. Thus, the fundamental nature of fundamental rights has something to do with
their universality, as reflected in art.1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
according to which: ‘‘All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights’’.
Interestingly, this sense of the universality of human rights is reflected in the European
Convention on Human Rights74 as well as in the Lisbon Treaty.75
Yet the reality described above, with its mixture of harmonised and unharmonised
areas, seems a far cry from the universality proclaimed by the Universal Declaration,
thus raising doubts as to whether Europeans are living up to their own notion of
fundamental rights.
Admittedly, universality is not uniformity. Higher standards are allowed and even
encouraged by some European instruments, including the Convention76 and the EU
Charter.77 Flexibility can be a way to cater for varying situations, as illustrated notably
by the margin of appreciation allowed to domestic authorities by the Strasbourg
Court. Moreover, as the example discussed above shows, some disharmony between
fundamental rights standards may have a positive effect by operating as an incentive
to raise standards which ‘‘lag behind’’, provided the process of adjusting them does
not take too long.
Still, there are limits to what can be done with fundamental rights without
undermining their fundamental nature. It is clear that the more different versions
and contents are given to the same fundamental rights and the more basic those rights
are, the less fundamental they become and the more their meaning is eroded by
relativism. This may reach the point where fundamental rights are so disparate in
content that there is little that is ‘‘fundamental’’ about them.
So, where should the line be drawn? It seems that one could usefully rely on the
criteria commonly used in European jurisprudence for identifying discriminations,
because disregard for the essentially universal nature of fundamental rights is very
close to, and can easily amount to, discrimination and arbitrariness. Roughly speaking,
in European jurisprudence a difference in treatment will not amount to discrimination
only if it is objectively justified, i.e. if it pursues a legitimate aim and is not being achieved
through disproportionate measures.78 With this in mind, how many of the differences
currently existing between the two European legal systems—and the examples above
are not exhaustive—would pass that test? Probably only a minority.
74 See the Preamble to the Convention.
75 art.21 TEU as amended by the Lisbon Treaty. See also the Preamble to the Treaty announcing
that the EU intends to draw inspiration ‘‘from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of
Europe, from which have developed the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights
of the human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law’’.
76 art.53 ECHR states that ‘‘[n]othing in [the] Convention shall be construed as limiting or
derogating from any of the human rights and fundamental freedoms which may be ensured
under the laws of any High Contracting Party or under any other agreement to which it is a
Party’’.
77 art.53 of the EU Charter.
78 See, among others, Andrejeva v Latvia (App. No.55707/00), judgment of February 18, 2009
ECtHR at [81]; C v Commission (T-307/00), judgment of January 30, 2003 ECJ at [48]–[49].
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Varying fundamental rights standards between two European legal systems are a
cause of greater concern than between a European and a national legal system. The latter
category is to a large extent covered either by the principle of subsidiarity underlying
the Convention79 or by the supremacy of EU law in relation to domestic law. By
contrast, there exists no formal hierarchy between the Convention and EU law, and
they both claim the right to set standards applicable to substantial part—if not all—of
the continent.80
What matters for the future is that if fundamental rights are to remain fundamental,
plurality in this field should be kept within reasonable and well thought-out boundaries.
This is especially relevant at a time when EU legislature is making a new attempt at
codifying some rights of the defence in criminal proceedings.81
In fact, it all comes down to a common responsibility of European legislatures and
courts to preserve the fundamental nature of fundamental rights. Ultimately, this means
that the effectiveness of these rights must not be reduced by needlessly increasing the
plurality and relativism of their definition and content. Indeed, as recently pointed out
by the Strasbourg Court, legal uncertainty can be incompatible with the very notion of
fundamental rights.82
79 art.53 ECHR (see fn.76 above).
80 Even accession by the EU to the Convention, as envisaged by the Lisbon Treaty (see new
art.6(2) TEU), will not as such have the effect of extending higher EU standards to persons whose
situation is governed by the Convention only. It is in principle only designed to prevent EU law
and institutions from breaching the Convention.
81 See the Draft Resolution of the Council on a roadmap for strengthening procedural rights of
suspected and accused persons in criminal proceedings (14791/09, DROIPEN 131/COPEN 203,
October 23, 2009).
82 Zolotukhin v Russia (App. No.14939/03), judgment of February 10, 2009 at [78].
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